2022

1. Edward J. Calabrese, Dima Yazji Shamoun, and Evgenios Agathokleous, “Dose Response and Risk Assessment: Evolutionary Foundations,” Environmental Pollution 309, (September 2022): 119787-119787, doi: 10.1016/j.envpol.2022.119787. .

2018

1. Edward J. Calabrese, Jaap C. Hanekamp, and Dima Yazji Shamoun, “The EPA Cancer Risk Assessment Default Model Proposal: Moving Away From the LNT,” The Journal of Dose-Response 16, no.3 (July 2018): 1-4, doi: 10.1177/1559325818789840.

2. Edward J. Calabrese, Dima Yazji Shamoun, and Jaap C. Hanekamp, “Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science.” Public Comment Before the Environmental Protection Agency, May 24, 2018.

3. Dima Yazji Shamoun and Theo Shamoun, “Economics of Risk,” Teaching Free Enterprise in Texas, Southern Methodist University O’Neil Center for Global Markets and Freedom, Summer 2018.

4. Dima Yazji Shamoun, ed. Economics of Ethics & Social Justice. (Cognella Academic Publishing, 2018).

2017

1. Dima Yazji Shamoun and Theo Shamoun, “Health Economics,” Teaching Free Enterprise in Texas, Southern Methodist University O’Neil Center for Global Markets and Freedom, Summer 2017.

2016

1. Dima Yazji Shamoun and Bruce Yandle, “Bootleggers and Baptists in the Garden of Good and Evil:
   Understanding America’s Entangled Economy.” In Law and Economics in Europe and the U.S.: The Legacy of Juergen Backhaus, edited by Alain Marciano and Giovanni Battista Ramello, 31–54. Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2016. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-47471-7_3.
   

2. James Broughel and Dima Yazji Shamoun, "The Risks of Ignorance in Chemical and Radiation Regulation." Real Clear Policy, September 21, 2016.
   

3. Dima Yazji Shamoun, Edward J. Calabrese, Richard Williams, and James Broughel, “Regulation Under Uncertainty: Use of The Linear No Threshold Model in Chemical and Radiation Exposure,” Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, July 2016. https://www.mercatus.org/system/files/mercatus-shamoun-regulation-uncertainty-v1.pdf
   

4. Dima Yazji Shamoun, "Linear No-Threshold Model and Standards for Protection Against Radiation," The Journal of Regulatory Toxicology and Pharmacology 77 (June 2016): 49-53, dos: 10.1016/j.yrtph.2016.02.011.
   

5. Edward J. Calabrese, Dima Yazji Shamoun, and Jaap C. Hanekamp, “The Integration of LNT and Hormesis for Cancer Risk Assessment Optimizes Public Health Protection,” The Journal of Health Physics 110, no.3 (March 2016): 256-259, doi: 10.1097/HP.0000000000000382.
   

6. Dima Yazji Shamoun and Bruce Yandle, “Asserting Presidential Preferences in a Regulatory Review Bureaucracy.” Public Choice (February 2016): 1–25, doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0316-9.
   

7. Dima Yazji Shamoun, "Warning Fatigue." Inside Sources, January 21, 2016.

2015 

1. Dima Yazji Shamoun, "Linear No-Threshold Model and Standards for Protection Against Radiation." Public Interest Comment Before the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, October 22, 2015.
   

2. Dima Yazji Shamoun, "Be Risk-Savvy: Consumers need to ask questions about the real risks of products." U.S. News and World Report, September 21, 2015.
   

3. Dima Yazji Shamoun, “Risky Business: Regulatory Agencies Need To Do Risk Assessment Right Or It Costs Taxpayers Big” U.S. News and World Report, August 3, 2015.
   

4. Dima Yazji Shamoun and Edward J. Calabrese, “On Objective Risk,” Mercatus Working Paper, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, July 2015.
   

5. Edward J. Calabrese, Dima Yazji Shamoun, and Jaap C. Hanekamp, “Cancer Risk Assessment: Optimizing Human Health through Linear Dose–Response Models,” Food and Chemical Toxicology 81 (July 2015): 137–40, doi:10.1016/j.fct.2015.04.023.
   

6. Thomas Carl Rustici, James Caton, Theo Shamoun, and Dima Yazji Shamoun, eds. Macroeconomics. The Monetary Foundations of the Macroeconomy Volume 1 (Cognella Academic Publishing, 2015).
   

7. Thomas Carl Rustici, James Caton, Theo Shamoun, and Dima Yazji Shamoun, eds. Macroeconomics. Past and Present Volume 2 (Cognella Academic Publishing, 2015).

2014

1. Patrick A. McLaughlin, Jerry Ellig, and Dima Yazji Shamoun, “Regulatory Reform in Florida: An Opportunity for Greater Competitiveness and Economic Efficiency," Florida State University Business Review 13, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 95-130. 

2. Richard E. Wagner and Dima Yazji Shamoun, "Form vs. Substance in Selection through Competition: Elections, Markets, and Political Economy," Public Choice 159, no. 3-4 (June 2014): 503–14, doi:10.1007/s11127-013-0065-y.

2012

1. Sherzod Abdukadirov and Dima Yazji Shamoun, “Inflated Benefits in Agencies’ Economic Analysis,” Mercatus on Policy, Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington, VA, August 2012. 

2. Thomas C. Rustici, Theo Shamoun, and Dima Yazji Shamoun, “The Smoot-Hawley Tariff and the Great Depression,” The Freeman, March 2012. 

Research in Progress

1. “The Moral Core of Transaction Costs,” (with Lloyd Cohen and Theo Shamoun).

   Abstract: 
   In this project we propose and describe a positive theory of “Coasian” transaction costs (TC). Since Coase, the definition of TC has been ambiguous at best; this has lead to confusion and, sometimes, improper legal and political prescriptions. The question of what subset of TC are the proper subject of economic analysis was framed by Buchanan & Stubblebine, developed by Dahlman, and seemingly answered by Calabresi. Yet the goal of this joint project with Lloyd Cohen and Theo Shamoun is to offer a different answer by way of re-classifying transaction costs into the appropriate subsets. Specifically, we build on the philosophy of Immanuel Kant to propose a test that isolates “Pareto-relevant transaction costs” (TXC) from those irrelevant costs included under the overbroad umbrella of Coase’s original TC definition; we go further, arguing that TXC are the only costs of relevance to law and economics scholars, and then developing on what we consider to be groundbreaking work in the field (Cooter & Porat’s “Anti-Insurance”). This new demarcation offers a better understanding of the role that legal, social, political, and other institutions can play in alleviating the transaction costs that lead to market failures and other external economies. 
   

2. “Lobbying Might: Empirically Testing the Bootleggers and Baptists Theory of Regulation,” (with Patrick McLaughlin), Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Arlington VA, 2017.
   
   Abstract: 
   Beginning with Pigou (1920), regulation was assumed to be in the “public” interest. Stigler (1971) challenged this assumption with the introduction of “special” interest groups (e.g. industry) who lobby for their private interests independently of (and in opposition to) the “public” interest. Skeptics, however, wondered how private interests might be enshrined in regulation open to public scrutiny but contrary to public interest.
   Yandle (1983) solved this problem by expanding the analysis to include “social” interest groups (e.g. religious or environmental) who lobby for regulation they honestly believe to be in the public interest but whose proposed solution falls in line with that of a “special” interest. Yet while theory and anecdote offer support for such analysis, this paper fills the gap in the literature of the political economy of regulation by providing the empirical evidence that has thus far been lacking.
   To do so we combine the RegData and QuantGov tools with textual analysis (i.e. plagiarism detection software). This technique will detect the changes to proposed rules made in light of Public Interest Comments (PICs) submitted by both of the aforementioned interest groups, and also those submitted by, e.g., unaffiliated, “disinterested” citizens (e.g., academics). We test the following hypothesis:
   “The proposed rule is more likely to be finalized (and the final rule will more closely mimic the language of PICs submitted by “special” interests) when the “special” interest is augmented by “social” interests than when the “special” interest lobbies alone for regulatory change.”

3. “Regulation: The Hybrid Good”

   Abstract:

   Searching for answers to the growth and demise of nations in the composition of their polities is not a novel task.  Economists, philosophers, and political scientists have debated for years to no conclusion.  Experimentation in political structures can take decades to yield results; often outpaced by changes in the polities and structures themselves.  What role does the form and composition of government play in the economy?  More specifically, what is the relationship between the size of the selectorate, from autocracy to democracy, and economic growth?  This paper develops a mathematical model to re-examine the role of the coalition size in determining the rate of economic activity.  The model uses the framework of X-Theory developed by C. K. Rowley, M.W. Jones-Lee, and M.A. Crew to extend and amend Bueno de Mesquita and Alistair Smith’s selectorate model and Mancur Olson’s super-encompassing stationary bandit model in order to demonstrate the regulatory relevance of Bruce Yandle’s (1983) bootleggers and Baptists model.  The model in this paper will show that growth in coalition size is not monotonically related to growth in economic activity; that the overuse of a previously unrecognized tool—regulation—can cause the decline of economic activity even in democratic settings. 

4. “LNT vs. Threshold: The Economic Implications of Models for Benefit-Cost Analyses,” (with Richard Williams).

   Abstract:

   This paper argues that the use of the linear no-threshold (LNT) model in risk-based regulation is problematic from an economic perspective, especially for purpose of conducting an objective benefit-cost analysis. The LNT model assumes that exposure to any level of a carcinogen or radiation is harmful, down to even the last molecule. Used primarily to be public health protective, the model has been the backbone of chemical and radiation risk regulation for many decades.
   In an economic analysis, the benefits and costs of each of a number of options to reduce risk are compared. The option that maximizes net benefits is presumed to be the most efficient option. That is one where those who receive the benefits could, in principle, compensate those who bear the costs by the biggest difference in benefits and costs.  For health and safety risks, the formula is benefits of reducing target risks, minus the costs of increased risks due to substitutes, minus other costs.
   It is now understood, however, that many compounds have a threshold below which no adverse response is observed and that the threshold occurs at the relevant human exposure levels which concern regulators. This new understanding must be incorporated into regulatory risk assessments, otherwise the benefit-cost calculus is distorted, leading regulators to adopt inefficient regulations.
   We will illustrate this distortion by developing a mathematical model and then examining empirical evidence from one chemical that has been shown to have a threshold, but is regulated as though it has an LNT function, and demonstrating the benefits and costs of a different regulatory limit.